VERSION 1 | THE ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT

THE 90 BUSES AND THE DUTY TO ACCOUNT

A governance and business assessment of the TUC decision

TUC sold buses provided for transport relief and applied the proceeds towards a secretariat. The decision requires an account of purpose, authority, value and member benefit. A useful building does not, by itself, demonstrate that changing the use of a welfare intervention was justified. The central question is what workers gained, what they lost and who exercised effective oversight.

The purpose of the intervention

Government presented its CNG bus programme as a response to transport costs. Official programme reporting also records a combined delivery of 405 buses to NLC and TUC under wage settlement arrangements. That aggregate does not independently reconcile the specific 90 buses raised by Joe Ajaero on 2 November 2026. TUC and government should publish the allocation and disposal records that do.

The sale and secretariat expenditure must be assessed against the original terms. Ownership, authority to dispose and permission to change purpose are separate questions. Even a sale at fair value would not establish that workers received the benefit for which the intervention was provided. A subsequent asset cannot automatically cure an inappropriate funding decision.

What other options did leadership consider

Operating buses entails drivers, insurance, maintenance, fuel access, depots and revenue controls. Those costs deserve serious assessment. However, operational difficulty does not make sale the inevitable answer. Professional fleet management, a regulated operating partnership or leasing with enforceable affordable-fare obligations may preserve the welfare objective, subject to the allocation terms.

Did leadership compare those alternatives with sale? The assessment should include operating costs, passenger demand, fare savings, reliability and the cost of downtime. The secretariat case should show acquisition and construction costs, rent savings, maintenance and financing obligations. The comparison must value the transport service forgone, rather than simply compare a fleet valuation with a property price.

Approval creates collective responsibility

NEC/NAC approval brings the approving body into the accountability chain. Members should know exactly which organ acted, its authority, the meeting date, quorum, proposal, supporting papers and recorded objections. Independent valuation, conflict declarations and any required government consent should be available. The minutes should identify who proposed the transaction; its origin should not be guessed.

A resolution demonstrates that a decision was endorsed. It does not alone demonstrate competent scrutiny. If the council failed to assess purpose, alternatives and member impact, the president cannot use collective approval as a shield, and council members cannot escape responsibility by pointing to the president.

Disclosure and spending discipline

Publish a dated chronology from receipt to sale and application of proceeds, including when members were informed. This will establish the actual disclosure interval and resolve the concern that the decision became widely known more than a year later. Members should not need a public dispute between labour leaders to obtain material information about welfare assets.

Permanent residence at Transcorp and the bulletproof vehicle raise additional stewardship questions. The financial account should identify the payer, duration, total cost, approvals and alternatives. Where union funds paid, extended hotel costs should be compared with suitable leased accommodation, and

vehicle expenditure supported by a documented security need and disciplined procurement. Necessity must be demonstrated, not presumed.

Before selling welfare assets to fund infrastructure, what savings were sought in leadership expenditure? A credible capital plan should examine dues, reserves, phased development and financing costs alongside reductions in discretionary spending. Dues are workers' earnings, so financing through dues also requires consent, budgeting and disclosure.

Leadership and institutional credibility

Leadership training should improve budgeting, procurement, risk management and reporting. Osifo reported attending advanced leadership and management training during the November television exchange. The useful test is what governance improvements follow. Training attendance cannot substitute for a clear account of a major asset decision.

For TUC, the reputational risk is a gap between the welfare it promises and the outcomes it demonstrates. Unresolved questions can weaken member confidence and the credibility of demands made of government. Osifo bears presidential responsibility for the system and its explanation. His previous PENGASSAN role creates reputational association, but responsibility for this transaction must follow actual institutional involvement.

The corrective programme

TUC should disclose the allocation terms and vehicle identifiers; all operating support received; the NEC/NAC papers; valuations, sale method and buyers; proceeds and bank reconciliation; and the secretariat property documents, contracts and payments. Buyer relationships and declared conflicts should be included. An independent review should assess compliance, fair value, decision quality and member impact.

Remedies should follow the findings: restoration of transport benefits where required, recovery of established losses, stronger controls and fair disciplinary proceedings where warranted. Sale alone does not establish personal enrichment or criminal wrongdoing; those conclusions require their own findings. Accountability is strengthened by specifying the failure and the responsible decision makers.

The standard for our new union

Our new union should bind every officer to purpose restrictions on donated assets, consultation thresholds for major disposals, quarterly financial summaries, annual independent audits and disclosed spending limits. Independent oversight must have access to records, while members must be able to question decisions without retaliation. The test of reform is whether these rules constrain the founders as firmly as their successors.

Workers deserve the financial trail, the reasons for the decision and the benefit account. Committee approval is the beginning of that explanation, not its completion.

EXPRESS YOUR INTEREST

Help build our new union, where members can question decisions and hold leaders accountable. Express your interest in being part of our new union at **https://save-union.org/interest.html**.

Public context: Federal Ministry of Information, 29 September 2024; Pi-CNG programme reporting; TheCable, 2 November 2026. Transaction and expenditure details follow the account provided to Save the Union.

Sources: Government announcement | Programme reporting | Television exchange report